State v. Moore Appellant\u27s Brief 1 Dckt. 40525 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-8-2013
State v. Moore Appellant's Brief 1 Dckt. 40525
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Moore Appellant's Brief 1 Dckt. 40525" (2013). Not Reported. 1192.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1192
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 






MICHAEL FRANCIS MOORE, ) 
) 
Defendant~Appellant. ) ___________ ) 
NO. 40525 
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2009-11603 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE RICHARD D. GREENWOOD 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #7353 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 




KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 





TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. .............................................................................. 4 
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................... 5 
I. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Order A Mental 
Health Evaluation ................................................................................................. 5 
A. Introduction ................................................................................................ 5 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Moore's 
Request For A Mental Health Evaluation ................................................... 5 
II. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Moore's 
Rule 35 Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of The New 
Information Presented At The Rule 35 Hearing .................................................. 13 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 18 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ......................................................................................... 19 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573 (1999) ................................................................. 15 
State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991) .................................................. 16 
State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348 (Ct. App. 1988) .............................................. 16 
State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295 (1990) ............................................................ 16 
State v. Collins, 144 Idaho 408 (Ct. App. 2007) .................................................... 6 
State v. Coonts, 137 Idaho 150 (Ct. App. 2002) ................................................... 7 
State v. Craner, 137 Idaho 188 (Ct. App. 2002) .................................................... 6 
State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 314 (2012) ............................................................ 7, 8 
State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820 (Ct. App. 2008) ............................................. 6, 7 
State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817 (2010) ........................................................... 6 
State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876 (Ct. App. 1994) .............................................. 5 
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982) ...................................................................... 15 
State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405 (1981) ............................................................... 15 
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593 (1982) .............................................................. 16 
State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251 (Ct. App. 1994) .................................................... 13 
Statutes 
I.C. § 19-2522 ............................................................................................. passim 
Rules 
1.C. § 19-2524 ....................................................................................................... 8 
I.C.R. 32(b) ........................................................................................................... 6 
I.C.R. 32(d) ........................................................................................................... 5 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Michael Francis Moore pied guilty to one count of 
felony burglary. He received a unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed. 
On appeal, Mr. Moore asserts that the district court erred in failing to order a 
mental health evaluation of Mr. Moore prior to sentencing. Mr. Moore also contends 
that the district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce his sentence in light of 
Mr. Moore's mental health issues and other mitigating factors, as well as the additional 
information submitted in conjunction with his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion. 
Mr. Moore requests that the judgment of conviction and sentence be vacated, a 
mental health evaluation ordered, and a new sentencing hearing conducted. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
On the morning of June 25, 2009, law enforcement officials responded to a 
shoplifting report. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), 1 p.2.) 
Mr. Moore was intoxicated and had shoplifted a six pack of Mike's Hard Lemonade2 
from a drugstore. (PSI, p.2.) As Mr. Moore was leaving the store, he struck a loss 
prevention specialist who tried to detain him. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Moore was charged by 
Information with one count of burglary, one count of petit theft, and one count of 
battery. 3 (R., pp.24-25.) 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file containing 
the PSI, and all included attachments. These documents will hereinafter be described 
as the "PSI" for ease of reference. 
2 Mike's Hard Lemonade is an alcoholic beverage. 
3 Mr. Moore was initially charged with a single count of robbery (R., pp.6-7), but the 
robbery charge was subsequently amended to burglary and two new crimes were 
added-petit theft and misdemeanor battery. (R., pp.17-18.) 
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Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Moore pied guilty to the shoplifting burglary 
charge and the other charges were dismissed. (12/01/09 Tr., p.2, L.s.2-13; R., pp.39-
40, 41-4 7.) Although the terms of the plea agreement provided that the State agreed to 
recommend probation, the plea agreement also provided that the State's 
recommendation would be conditioned upon, inter alia, the defendant having no failures 
to appear. (12/01/09 Tr., p.3, Ls.8-12; R., pp.42-47.) The district court ordered a PSI 
and a substance abuse evaluation prior to sentencing. (12/01/09 Tr., p.14, L.8 - p.15, 
L.1.) 
Mr. Moore failed to appear at sentencing and the district court issued a warrant. 
(R., pp.48-50.) Mr. Moore was arrested on the warrant. (R., p.50.) The sentencing 
hearing was continued several times to allow Mr. Moore sufficient time to read the PSl.4 
(See generally 3/16/10 Tr.; see generally 3/23/10 Tr.; 3/30/10 Tr., p.3, Ls.6-10.) During 
one such hearing on March 23, 2010, Mr. Moore's counsel advised the district court 
that, at the time of the incident, Mr. Moore was experiencing symptoms of his mental 
illness and, based on a recent conversation with him at the jail, she believed that his 
mental health issues likely played a "very big role" in the incident. (3/23/10 Tr., p.10, 
Ls.4-9.) Defense counsel asked the court to order a mental health evaluation. (3/23/10 
Tr., p.10, Ls.13-16.) The district court reviewed Mr. Moore's mental health history 
contained in the records attached to the PSI and noted that: 
Well, a pure evaluation - I have the benefit of the report from 
lntermountain hospital of February 28th of '05, the discharge, which lays 
out the diagnosis on Axis I with schizoaffective disorder with alcohol and 
polysubstance abuse, along with some other things. 
And then we have a psychiatric evaluation that was done by Saint 
Alphonsus on - I love the way they hid the dates of these things. Well, 
4 Mr. Moore advised the court that he does not read very well and needed additional 
time to review the PSI. (PSI, p.56.) 
2 
again, this is in August of '08. There is a - it doesn't read the same, 
necessarily, as a court-ordered evaluation, but I think it tells me what I'm 
going to find out from a court-ordered evaluation, that the defendant does 
have a history of schizophrenic-type mental illness. 
So I'm not inclined to continue this for mental health - I mean, the records 
go back - I was just trying to remember how far back they went. And they 
go back clear to 2002. I'm looking at one in January of '04 where he 
presents at the emergency department with histories of hearing voices 
and definitely psychotic state. So, Counsel, I'm not inclined to [order a 
mental health evaluation]. 
(3/23/10Tr., p.11, L.8-p.12, L.3.) 
At the sentencing hearing the State asked to be released from its obligations 
under the plea agreement, as Mr. Moore had failed to appear for his sentencing 
hearing.5 (3/30/10 Tr., p.3, Ls.3-18.) The defense did not object, but asked that 
Mr. Moore be placed on probation with mental health and substance abuse treatment. 
(R., pp.59-60; 3/30/10 Tr., p.7, L.24- p.8, L.15.) 
The district court imposed upon Mr. Moore a sentence of five years, with one 
year fixed. (3/30/10 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-3; R., pp.61-63, 72-74.) Thereafter, Mr. Moore filed 
a timely I.C.R. 35 Motion for Reduction of Sentence. (R., p.70-71.) Although 
Mr. Moore provided new information for the district court to consider in support of his 
I.C.R. 35 motion for leniency, the district court denied Mr. Moore's motion. (R, pp.86-
88.) After a post-conviction action, the district court re-entered the Judgement of 
Conviction on November 19, 2012, thereby restoring Mr. Moore's right to appeal. 
(R., pp.90-91.) On November 29, 2012, Mr. Moore filed a notice of appeal timely from 
the re-entered Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.92-94.) 
5 Mr. Moore was homeless and "living on the streets" for more than a month before he 
failed to appear for his sentencing hearing. (PSI, p.13.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Moore's motion for a mental health 
evaluation? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Moore's Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence in light of the new 




The District Court Erred When It Failed To Order A Mental Health Evaluation 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Moore asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
request for a mental health evaluation when his mental health was a significant factor at 
sentencing. Mr. Moore had a history of six psychiatric hospitalizations and the district 
court had been advised that, at the time of the incident, Mr. Moore was experiencing 
symptoms of his mental illness. Therefore, he submits that he is entitled to have his 
conviction vacated, a mental health evaluation ordered, and a new sentencing hearing 
held. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Moore's Request For A Mental 
Health Evaluation 
"After the determination of guilt it is essential that the court receive adequate 
information about the defendant before handing down the sentence. Individualizing 
sentences is impossible without such information." State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 
878 (Ct. App. 1994) (internal citations omitted). Before imposing a sentence, the court 
may appoint a psychologist to examine and report on the mental condition of the 
defendant. See I.C. § 19-2522; I.C.R. 32(d); McFarland, 125 Idaho 878-79. The legal 
standards governing the district court's decision whether to order a psychological 
evaluation and report are contained in I.C. §19-2522: 
(1) If there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will 
be a significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown, the court 
shall appoint at least one (1) psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to 
examine and report upon the mental condition of the defendant. 
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(3) The report of the examination shall include the following: 
(a) A description of the nature of the examination; 
(b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition of 
the defendant; 
(c) An analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect 
and level of functional impairment; 
(d) A consideration of whether treatment is available for the 
defendant's mental condition; 
( e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or 
nontreatment; 
(f) A consideration of the risk of danger which the defendant may 
create for the public if at large. 
"The requirements of I.C. § 19-2522 are complimented by Idaho Criminal Rule 
32 which specifies the elements to be included in the presentence report. These 
elements include information on the health of the defendant where relevant to the 
sentencing decision, !.C.R. 32(b)(8), and, where appropriate, the presentence 
investigator's analysis and recommendation regarding a psychological examination, 
!.C.R. 32(b)(10)." State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 822 (2010). 
The district court has discretion to deny a defendant's request for a psychological 
evaluation. State v. Collins, 144 Idaho 408, 409 (Ct. App. 2007). However, with any 
discretionary decision, the district court must act within the bounds of its discretion, 
consistent with applicable legal principles. State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 823 
(Ct. App. 2008). The applicable legal standard for reviewing a district court's decision to 
deny a psychological evaluation is governed by I.C. § 19-2522 (1 ). State v. Craner, 137 
Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 2002). 
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A district court is required to consider a defendant's mental condition, if it is a 
significant factor at sentencing. I.C. § 19-2522. Idaho Code Section 19-2522(1) 
provides: "[i]f there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will be a 
significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown, the court shall appoint at 
least one ... psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and report upon the 
mental condition of the defendant." I.C. § 19-2522(1). "The language of the statute is 
mandatory, requiring that the trial court obtain a psychological evaluation whenever 
there is reason to believe that the defendant's mental condition will be of significance for 
the determination of an appropriate sentence." State v. Coonts, 137 Idaho 150, 152 
(Ct. App. 2002). The appellate courts have found error in a district court's refusal to 
order a psychological evaluation prior to sentencing when a mental evaluation is clearly 
necessary. State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 823 (Ct. App. 2008). 
In State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 314 (2012), the defendant requested a 
psychological evaluation prior to sentencing. Hanson, 152 Idaho at 318. The district 
court denied the request, finding, inter alia, that a psychological evaluation was not 
necessary because it did not believe that the additional information provided by a 
psychological evaluation would be helpful at sentencing. Id. After the Idaho Court of 
Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court for a 
presentence psychological evaluation and resentencing, the Idaho Supreme Court 
granted review. Id. The Hanson Court reviewed the district court's decision for an 
abuse of discretion recognizing that the psychological evaluation was mandatory if 
"there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant would be a significant 
factor at sentencing." Id. at 318. 
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The Hanson Court found that the record demonstrated that the defendant's 
mental condition was a significant factor at sentencing and reversed the district court's 
denial of Hanson's request for a psychological evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 
and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 319-320. The Idaho Supreme 
Court held: 
[W]hen the record showed a defendant with a substantial history of serious 
mental illness, the defendant's mental condition will be a significant factor in 
determining an appropriate sentence and I .C. § 19-2522 requires the sentencing 
court to obtain a psychological evaluation prior to sentencing. 6 
Hanson, 152 Idaho at 320 ( emphasis added). 
Mr. Moore suffers from serious mental health problems for which he was not 
being treated at the time of this incident. His mental health issues were so apparent 
that the PSI investigator recommended that Mr. Moore be screened for entry into mental 
health court. (PSI, p.19.) Defense counsel also asked that Mr. Moore be screened for 
mental health court. (3/16/10 Tr., p.4, Ls.2-12.) However, the State and the district 
court opposed such a screening, and there was some concern that he may not be 
eligible due to the type of crime he had pied guilty to. (3/23/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.10-13.) 
Defense counsel then requested a mental health evaluation pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-2522. (3/23/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.13-16.) The district court noted that it had a copy 
of a February 28, 2005 report from lntermountain Hospital which set out Mr. Moore's 
Axis I diagnosis, and an evaluation from Saint Alphonsus dated August of 2008, and 
commented that it had records dating back to 2002. (3/23/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.8-25.) The 
district court concluded that the 2008 psychiatric evaluation done by Saint Alphonsus 
6 The Hanson Court did set forth an exception-where an evaluation under I.C. § 19-
2524 has been ordered and the resulting report satisfies the requirements of I.C. §19-
2522. Id. at n.2. Such is not the case here, as the report ordered pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2524 analyzed only Mr. Moore's substance abuse. 
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told the court what it would have found out from a court-ordered evaluation-that the 
defendant has a history of schizophrenic-type mental illness-and denied Mr. Moore's 
request for a mental health evaluation. (3/23/10 Tr., p.11, L.14- p.12, L.3.) However, 
the district court relied on the information contained in a two-page report that was two 
years old, and which did not provide all of the information required by Idaho Code§ 19-
2522(3). (R., pp.150-151.) The district court admitted that "it doesn't read the same, 
necessarily, as a court-ordered evaluation, but I think it tells me what I'm going to find 
out from a court-ordered evaluation, that the defendant does have history of 
schizophrenic-type mental illness." (3/23/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.17-21.) Notably, the August 
2008 report by Saint Alphonsus was less than two pages long and did not reflect any 
analysis of the defendant's level of functional impairment, or any analysis of the relative 
risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment, or a consideration of the risk of danger 
which the defendant may create for the public if at large. (R., pp.150-151.) 
The information statutorily required to be contained in the evaluation is not just 
what mental illness the defendant had been previously diagnosed with, but also: 
(a) A description of the nature of the examination; 
(b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition of 
the defendant; 
(c) An analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect 
and level of functional impairment; 
(d) A consideration of whether treatment is available for the 
defendant's mental condition; 
(e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or 
nontreatment; 
(f) A consideration of the risk of danger which the defendant may 
create for the public if at large. 
1.C. § 19-2522(3). 
9 
In this case, Mr. Moore's mental condition was a significant factor for determining 
an appropriate sentence. The district court was aware of Mr. Moore's lengthy history of 
serious mental illness. Mr. Moore had previously undergone six psychiatric 
hospitalizations for mental illness. (PSI, p.150.) The district court had before it well 
over 100 pages of records that reflected a diagnosis of schizophrenia with delusions 
and hallucinations and which also documented depression and suicidal ideations. 
The district court commented at sentencing regarding Mr. Moore's mental health 
problems, "I acknowledge that you have mental health problems. But there are people 
with mental health problems that don't commit crimes. They get on their medicines and 
they stay on them." (3/30/W Tr., p.11, Ls.9-13.) The district court then imposed its 
sentence of five years unified, with one year fixed, telling Mr. Moore that the sentence 
was "in light of your need to get stabilized on your medication and get some structure." 
(3/30/10 Tr., p.11, L.25- p.12, L.5.) 
In this case, the record is replete with indications that Mr. Moore suffered from 
severe mental health issues and those issues were affecting him on the date of the 
incident. Further, Mr. Moore, when asked about his mental health by the presentence 
investigator, said that he believes he would benefit from mental health counseling. 
(PSI, p.15.) Additionally, Mr. Moore's defense counsel, after speaking to him at the jail 
while he was reviewing his PSI, revealed that, "at the time of this incident, Mr. Moore 
was experiencing hallucinations, symptoms of his schizophrenia ... [a]nd it has come to 
my attention that his mental health issues probably played a very big role in this 
incident." (3/23/10Tr., p.9, L.14-p.10, L.9.) 
Mr. Moore's mental health should have been a significant mitigating factor at 
sentencing, but the district court may have viewed Mr. Moore's acts attributable to his 
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mental health condition as aggravating facts suggesting that Mr. Moore could not be 
compliant on probation. At sentencing, the district court commented on the fact that 
Mr. Moore failed to appear for his sentencing hearing: "And for whatever reason you 
just decided not to show. It wasn't like you committed some other big crime or fled the 
country or something. You were just back on the street drinking and getting in trouble." 
(3/30/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.19-23.) Had the district court obtained a mental health evaluation 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522, the court could have referred to the evaluation to assist the 
court in determining the risk Mr. Moore posed to the community. Mr. Moore's mental 
health issues were raised both prior to his guilty plea, several times prior to sentencing, 
and during sentencing. Further, the district court relied on Mr. Moore's actions 
surrounding the incident when fashioning his sentence. 
Notably, when Mr. Moore was seen in 2003, he spoke to his treatment provider 
about his auditory and visual hallucinations and expressed his concern that, because of 
his hallucinations, he did not know what was real and what was not real and that he 
feared that he was going to end up backhanding someone and hurting someone. (PSI, 
p.192.) In 2009, in this case, Mr. Moore backhanded a store clerk who was trying to 
stop him from shoplifting. (PSI, p.2.) Because only a portion of the information required 
by I.C. § 19-2522 was available to the district court at sentencing, the district court 
should have ordered a full mental health evaluation as mandated by I.C. § 19-2522. 
Additionally, while the district court stated that it intended to rely upon the 2008 
report conducted at Saint Alphonsus, a report from 2005 indicated that Mr. Moore was 
"gravely disabled with auditory hallucination and delusional" (PSI, p.164), therefore, 
even though the February 28, 2008 report indicated that Mr. Moore's "judgment was 
intact" (PSI, p.150), the degree of Mr. Moore's illness was not always consistent from 
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year to year, necessitating a mental health evaluation to allow the district court to 
assess, inter alia, the factors listed in I.C. § 19-2522, including (1)(c): "An analysis of 
the degree of the defendant's illness or defect and level of functional impairment.''7 
The limited information before the district court at sentencing does not function 
as an adequate substitute for an I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation. As stated above, the August 
2008 evaluation performed through Saint Alphonsus did not meet the requirements of 
I.C. § 19-2522. Although the substance abuse evaluation mentioned Mr. Moore's 
mental health, it did not inform the court on all of the I.C. § 19-2522 factors, such as 
consideration of whether treatment is available for a defendant's mental condition, the 
relative risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment, and the risk of danger that the 
defendant presents to the public. (PSI, pp.22-31.) Therefore, there never was a mental 
health evaluation which complied with the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522. 
In sum, where the district court considered Mr. Moore's mental health when 
sentencing him, thus indicating that Mr. Moore's mental health was a significant factor at 
sentencing, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Moore's request and refused to 
order a mental health evaluation pursuant I.C. § 19-2522. 
Mr. Moore's mental condition was a significant factor at sentencing. The court 
acted outside the bounds of its discretion and contrary to Idaho Code § 19-2522 when it 
denied Mr. Moore's request for a mental health evaluation. The district court's judgment 
of conviction should be vacated, a mental health examination ordered, and a new 
sentencing hearing conducted. 
7 Additionally, Mr. Moore's symptoms varied each time he was treated. On May 23, 
2004, Mr. Moore was admitted to the Saint Alphonsus emergency room for 
hallucinations. (PSI, p.178.) He had been hearing voices that told him "he is a piece of 
crap." (PS I, p.178.) At that time Mr. Moore reported that the voices were overpowering 
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11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Moore's Rule 35 Motion 
For A Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of The New Information Presented At The 
Rule 35 Hearing 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the 
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original 
sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, 
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional 
information presented with the motion for reduction." Id. 
Mr. Moore asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the mitigating 
factors that exist in his case. 
Mr. Moore has had a difficult life.8 Mr. Moore's parents were severe alcoholics 
and his mother physically abused him. (PSI, p.11.) He was placed in foster care at age 
12 or 13 but returned to his family a few years later. (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Moore's mother 
and older brother introduced him to alcohol and drugs at age 9. (PSI, pp.11, 15.) When 
Mr. Moore was 18 or 19 years old, he was pushed out of a moving vehicle and landed 
on his head, causing brain and spinal damage such that he has both short and long-
him and the voices were the worst they had ever been since he first started hearing 
them at age 12. (PSI, p.178.) 
8 The district court noted at sentencing: 
The first thing that struck me in going through this PSI was what insurmountable 
obstacles this defendant had as a child. Alcoholic parents, a mother that beat 
him living on the streets and shelters. Placed in foster care apparently for some 
time during his early adolescence. And then a lifetime of drugs and crimes. 
(3/30/10 Tr., p.9, Ls.18-25.) 
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term memory loss. (PSI, p.15.) At the time of the incident he was living at the Boise 
Mission homeless shelter, and had been homeless for most of the last 15 years. (PSI, 
pp.18, 105, 108.) Mr. Moore is unable to maintain steady employment due to his mental 
health conditions, and told the presentence investigator that because he has paranoid 
schizophrenia, he thinks that most people hate him. (PSI, p.14.) Mr. Moore also told 
his presentence investigator that he prefers to be alone because he "hear[s] voices and 
think[s] people are plotting against [him]." (PSI, p.12.) One of Mr. Moore's goals is to 
be able to get a good regime of mental health medications so he stops feeling paranoid 
all of the time. (PSI, p.18.) 
Mr. Moore has been diagnosed with mental health conditions-schizophrenia 
and bi-polar disorder--in 2004. (3/30/10 Tr., p.7, Ls.4-5; PSI, p.15.) However, he had a 
history of auditory hallucinations beginning at age 9 or 10. (PSI, p.105.) Mr. Moore 
intermittently received treatment for his schizophrenia from the Idaho Department of 
Health & Welfare. (PSI, pp.90-111.) He has had multiple psychiatric hospitalizations 
since age 14. (PSI, pp.103., 107) Mr. Moore first received mental health treatment for 
depression when he was 13 years old, from State Hospital North. (PSI, pp.71-72.) 
Mr. Moore has been treated for his mental illness at the St. Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center Psychiatric Unit and lntermountain State Hospital in the past. (PSI, p.15.) 
Mr. Moore had not been taking his medication and had been drinking alcohol heavily in 
the past several months prior to his arrest. (PSI, p.15.) Prior to this incident, Mr. Moore 
had not seen a mental health professional since 2008. (3/23/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.14-18; 
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PSI, p.15.) During his incarceration in county jail just prior to his sentencing on this 
charge, he was disoriented and having active hallucinations.9 (PSI, p.117.) 
Further, Mr. Moore was experiencing the symptoms of his afflictions, including 
hallucinations, at the time he committed the shoplifting burglary. (3/30/10 Tr., p.7, Ls.7-
8.) Mr. Moore had not been taking his mental health medications at the time of the 
incident and was self-medicating, using alcohol. (3/30/10 Tr., p.6, Ls.18-20.) The Idaho 
Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court to 
consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 
573, 581 (1999). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered 
as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. 
Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence 
based on Nice's lack of prior record and the fact that "the trial court did not give proper 
consideration of the defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing 
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem." 
Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and 
alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct, could be a 
mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 (1981). The majority of 
Mr. Moore's criminal activity has been while under the influence of alcohol. (PSI, pp.3-
9.) Further, Mr. Moore never received mental health treatment while growing up and 
instead was taught how to self-medicate by his family members. (3/30/1 O Tr., p. 7, Ls.9-
9 Mr. Moore did not know where he was (jail), and at times he believed that he was at 
the supermarket buying food (pizza), or at Starbuck's with a lady sitting by him drinking 
coffee, and he also told staff that there were puppies on his bed. (PSI, pp.117-118, 
140.) 
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12, p.6, L.20- p.7, L.3; PSI, p.15.) Mr. Moore realizes that he is an alcoholic and wants 
to stop drinking and seek treatment. 10 (PSI, p.16.) 
Additionally, Mr. Moore has expressed his remorse for committing the instant 
offense. Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses 
remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103 
Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,209 (Ct. App. 1991). In State v. 
Alberts, the Idaho Court of Appeals reduced the sentence imposed "[i]n light of Alberts' 
expression of remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to 
accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character." Id. 121 Idaho at 204. 
See also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982) (reducing sentence of first time 
offender who accepted responsibility for his acts and had the support of his family in his 
rehabilitation efforts); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(reducing sentence of first time offender who accepted responsibility, expressed 
remorse, and had been of good character before the offense at issue) reversed on other 
grounds, State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295 (1990). 
Mr. Moore accepted responsibility for his actions and expressed his remorse 
before he was sentenced: 
I am taking full responsibility for my action that brought me here. I would 
like to apologize to Rite Aid and its employees for any problems I might 
have caused them and taking their merchandise. I would like to thank you 
again, sir, for giving me some continuances so I can study the PSI. Thank 
you sir. 
(3/30/1 O Tr., p.9, Ls.3-10.) Mr. Moore told the presentence investigator that he felt 
"stupid and ashamed" for committing the crime. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Moore also wanted the 
10 Mr. Moore told the presentence investigator, "I drink too much "and that he would "go 
to any treatment programs offered." (PSI, p.16.) 
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court to know that he realizes that he has to stop his criminal lifestyle as it is getting him 
nowhere. (PSI, p.18.) He wants to become a productive member of society and be a 
better father to his 9 year old son. (PSI, pp.13, 18.) 
Mr. Moore asserts that had the district court properly considered his remorse, 
desire for treatment, and mental health issues, it would have reduced his sentence 
pursuant to his Rule 35 motion. He further asserts that his sentence should have been 
reduced in light of the new information submitted in conjunction with his Rule 35 motion. 
In support of his motion for a sentence reduction, Mr. Moore submitted 
information regarding his time in custody. (R., pp.78-83.) Since his sentencing, 
Mr. Moore has used his time in prison to better himself. He has completed a series of 
classes-anger management, MRT and relapse prevention. (R., p.80.) 
Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district 
court at the time of sentencing, it is clear that the district court abused its discretion in 
failing to reduce Mr. Moore's sentence in response to his Rule 35 motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Moore respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district 
court for a mental health evaluation and a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he 
requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 8th day of October, 2013. 
SALL M. COOLEY J 
Deputy State Appellate "Jiublic Defender 
r 
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